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State Revenue Forecasting Accuracy 
Abstract 
This paper examines forecasting accuracy of state revenue forecasting for 50 states using data published 
on the National Association of State Budget Officer’s (NASBO) website (www.nasbo.org).  The data 
shows four categories of revenue: sales tax, corporate income tax, personal income tax, and all other (as 
a residual from total taxes). It shows some evidence that forecast bias reflects a hedge against 
uncertainty; however, there is also evidence that there is a counterbalancing preference to find the 
money needed to provide the services demanded. 
 
State Revenue Forecasting Accuracy 
That there is revenue forecast underestimation bias is well established  (Blackley & DeBoer, 1993; S. 
Bretschneider & Schroeder, 1985; S. I. Bretschneider & Gorr, 1987, 1992; S. I. Bretschneider, Gorr, 
Grizzle, & Klay, 1989; S. I. Bretschneider, Straussman, & Mullins, 1988; Burkhead, 1956; Grizzle & Klay, 
1994; Heinemann, 2006; Klay & Grizzle, 1992; Rodgers & Joyce, 1996; Voorhees, 2006; Williams, 2012) 
and it is frequently associated with political motivation. Williams (2012) shows that disaggregating 
revenue into components and horizons helps understand the characteristics of bias in New York City’s 
revenue forecast. Williams’ findings include that forecast bias may be different for different revenue 
types and that forecast bias exacerbates over longer horizons. 
This paper examines forecast accuracy and bias among the 50 US states from 1993 through 2011 
decomposing revenue into four parts, examining the influence of horizons, and examining potential 
explanatory factors that may be associated with revenue forecast bias. While it is understood that 
political motivation may influence forecast revenue forecast bias, what that influence is and how it 
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affects bias is unclear. Forecast bias itself has subtle implications. Underforecasting revenue provides 
those responsible for managing the system a hedge against risk. However, it also legitimizes the 
preferences of those who wish to stem government growth or cut its size because lower estimates of 
revenue inhibit voluntary program growth. 
Overall, there are many contradictory expectations. Those wishing to avoid taxes may wish to stem 
government growth and therefore prefer underestimation; but underestimation can lead to the belief 
that taxes must be raised, even when revenue is actually adequate. Those preferring to maintain or 
grow government services have similarly contradictory preferences: when there is a perception of 
adequate or surplus revenue, government services can be maintained or grow. However, when there is 
adequate revenue, policy makers will not intentionally grow revenue sources and they may even reduce 
taxes. Conditions that lead to intentional growth in revenue sources also lead to the view that perhaps 
government should shrink. These contradictory conditions leave it unclear who, other than risk averse 
managers, will prefer what level of underestimation.  
Hypotheses 
The most general hypothesis of this paper is that there is forecast bias and that the direction of the 
forecast bias is for underforecasting. This expectation is consistent with the vast majority of the 
literature cited and much more written elsewhere. 
Hypothesis 1a:  There is a negative coefficient on an appropriate measure of forecast bias. 
Williams (2012) shows that forecast bias is found with a various New York City revenue types when total 
revenue is decomposed. He shows that examining forecast detail provides deeper insight into bias. 
Hypothesis 1b:  There is a negative coefficient on an appropriate measure of forecast bias with 




Williams (2012) shows that where there is forecast bias, it exacerbates over time, that is, there is a 
negative slope associated with the horizon. His literature review explains that this finding is common in 
in forecast methods literature that looks at forecast results over various horizons (Makridakis et al., 
1982; Makridakis et al., 1993; Makridakis & Hibon, 2000).  
Hypothesis 2:  There is a negative coefficient on the measure of forecast horizon. 
Michael Brogan (2012) shows that there is a linkage between forecast errors and the political cycle. He 
examines features such as political party of the governor (Democratic), term year of the governor 
(number of years remaining), an interaction between governor’s party and party division in the 
legislature, and the share of vote received by the elected governor. He examines a complex “Democratic 
factor,” which also has an effect and has an interaction effect with divided government. He finds a weak 
direct effect for party division in the legislature. These effects reflect a variety of possible political 
factors, which are included in this study. These findings suggest that bias will, in part, be explained by 
political party and electoral politics: 
Hypothesis 3a:  When the forecast is made by a Democratic administration (governor), there is 
an effect on the revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3b: When the forecast is made by a third party administration (governor), there is an 
effect on the revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3c: When the forecast is made in a state where there is a divided legislature, there is 
an effect on revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3d: There is a relationship between revenue forecast bias and the governor’s share 
of the vote in the most recent gubernatorial election.  
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Hypothesis 3e: When the forecast is made in the first year or a new governor, there is an effect 
on the revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3f: When the forecast is made in the first year after a governor’s party change to 
Democrat, there is an effect on the revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3g: When the forecast is made in the first year after a governor’s party change to 
Republican, there is an effect on the revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3h: When the forecast is made in the first year after a governor’s party change to 
Third Party, there is an effect on the revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3i: The number of years remaining until the next gubernatorial election is associated 
with revenue forecast bias.  
Hypothesis 3j: When the forecast is made in the most frequent legislative election year, there is 
an effect on the revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3k: An interaction between divided government and governor’s party (Democratic) 
is associated with revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3l: Brogan’s Democratic factor is associated with revenue forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 3m: An interaction between Brogan’s Democratic factor and the governor’s party 
(Democratic) is associated with revenue forecast bias. 
These hypotheses set out the broad set of political influences on the forecast process. Many of the data 
are coded as indicators, valued 1 when the condition is met and 0 otherwise, from National Center for 
State Legislature data and data from Party affiliations in the state legislatures : a year by year summary, 
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1796-2006 (Dubin, 2007). Brogan’s Democratic factor is included using a dataset and Stata command 
functions supplied by Brogan through personal contact and is lagged one period. 
Larger states may have more resources for their revenue forecast effort. If underestimation bias reflects 
budget official risk aversion, then where risk is mitigated in other ways, then the use of bias as means of 
achieving risk avoidance may be less attractive. Thus, larger states may have a smaller forecast bias. 
Simonsen, Robins and Helgerson (2001), found that jurisdiction size may serve as a proxy for jurisdiction 
management capacity. Management capacity may mitigate uncertainty in that where jurisdictions have 
more capacity, they are more confident of their actual forecasts and therefore need less of a hedge 
against mistaken over-forecasting 
Hypothesis 4: When the forecast is made by a larger state (by population), the forecast under-
forecast bias is smaller. 
In real world revenue forecasting, accuracy is thought to interact with the business cycle; however, the 
exact relationship is not clear. Empirical forecast methods follow trends, so as the business cycle 
accelerates, an under-forecast bias should become more severe; while as it decelerates the under-
forecast may become less severe or even reverse. However, actual forecasts may be made through a 
mixture of empirical and judgmental methods. Judgmental methods may anticipate or even over-
anticipate accelerating or decelerating business cycles, thereby neutralizing or having the opposite 
effect of purely empirical methods. On the whole, while there is a potential impact of business cycle on 
forecast bias, the direction of impact is uncertain. 
Hypothesis 5: The acceleration or deceleration of the state economy (state GDP) will have an 
impact on forecast bias. 
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Unlike practices in developed nations, undeveloped nations are sometimes reported to exhibit positive 
forecast bias (Rubin, 1987). They are also frequently reported to engage in post-adoption budget 
modifications that may reflect matters associated with appropriations (Caiden, 1981; Caiden & 
Wildavsky, 1974; Omolehinwa & Roe, 1989). These observations lead to the possibility that there is a 
relationship between revenue effort (the degree to which taxing capacity is actually used) and forecast 
bias. 
 Hypothesis 6a: Positive forecast bias (or cancellation of negative bias) is positively associated 
with revenue effort. 
The data for revenue effort are calculated from the U. S. Census Bureau Survey of State and Local 
Finance. Local revenue is included because the distribution of taxes between state and local levels 
differs from state to state. So a second element of this same factor is the share of the revenue that is 
actually attributable to the state. It is not clear whether this should result in a positive or negative bias. 
Hypothesis 6b: State share of total state and local revenue is significantly associated with 
forecast bias.  
The effect of revenue effort may be offset somewhat by receipt of transfer funds from the federal 
government. 
 
Hypothesis 6c: Federal fund transfer is associated with forecast bias.  
A more direct consideration of revenue capacity in the personal income of residents of the state.  
Hypothesis 6d:  Estimated real per capita personal income is associated with revenue forecast 
bias. 
Another measure of revenue capacity which may also capture components of the business cycle is the 
per capita real GDP 
 
Hypothesis 6e :  State Per Capita Real GDP is associated with forecast bias. 
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Brogan finds a positive effect of the unemployment rate on budget accuracy. Unemployment is 
reasonably associated with forecast bias because it may capture components of the business cycle not 
otherwise identified with other variables or it may reflect another form of uncertainty. 
Hypothesis 6f:  The state unemployment rate has a positive association with forecast bias. 
States collect taxes from a variety of sources.  There has been considerable researcher into revenue 
diversification and a standard measure of revenue diversification, sometimes labeled RD is: 
𝑅𝐷 = 1 −𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑁 
Where, RD is the measure of revenue diversification and HHIN is the Normalized Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index (Calabrese & Carroll, 2012; Carroll, 2005; Carroll & Stater, 2009; Hendrick, Jimenez, & Lal). There is 
no evidence that past research has specifically associated revenue diversification with forecast bias. 
However, there are two competing reasons why it is anticipated that it is. First, because a jurisdiction 
has limited management capacity, the forecasting of more revenue types is more difficult. As one of the 
principle explanations of underestimation bias is a hedge against risk, it stands to reason that where 
capacity is insufficient, underestimation bias will increase. Therefore, when revenue is more diverse, 
there is more underestimation bias. Alternatively, where there are fewer sources of revenue, despite 
accuracy gains through the use of increased resources used for the limited number of forecasts, there is 
may be more risk associated with each individual forecast, as there are fewer other revenue sources 
that might have cancelling errors. Thus, the perception of risk leading to an underestimation hedge 
could arise from a limited number of substantial revenue sources. Consequently, it is anticipated that 
revenue diversity may affect bias, but the direction of affect is not known. 
Hypothesis 7: The measure RD is associated with revenue forecast bias.  
The data for used with respect to Hypothesis 7 is categorized in 7 broad groups, for calculation of RD. 
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In an 2011 report on state revenue forecasting (Boyd, Dadayan, & Ward, 2011), other factors that are 
identified as potentially affecting revenue accuracy include the volatility of the revenue source, the 
value of a budget stabilization fund, and the use, by the state, of biennial budgeting. These factors are 
related to risk aversion. A more volatile revenue source can be expected to have a larger forecast error, 
so the risk averse decision maker may need to adjust the forecast by a larger share of the forecast to 
avoid overstating revenue. Two types of measures of volatility are used. First, there is a direct measure 
of volatility of the data, this measure is the coefficient of variation (CV) of the series for the five years 
preceding the forecast year. Second, Boyd et al. (2011) suggest that natural resource related industries 
contribute to some parts of revenue instability, so the share of the state GDP attributable to mining and 
the share attributable to farming are considered. 
Hypothesis 8a: There is a negative association between the forecast error and the CV measure 
for each tax type, CIT, PIT, and Sales Tax. 
Hypothesis 8b: There is a negative association between the forecast error and the mining share 
of state GDP. 
Hypothesis 8c: There is a negative association between the forecast error and the farming share 
of state GDP. 
Hypothesis 8d: The relative size of the budget stabilization fund is negatively associated with 
forecast bias. 
Hypothesis 8e: States that budget biennially exhibit a larger forecast bias. 
The conceptual opposite of a budget stabilization fund is debt. Debt creates obligations that must be 
met and weakens the ability to offset unplanned expenditures. Two measures of debt are the debt itself 
as ratio to the state’s GDP and the state’s bond rating. Because debt creates uncertainty it may increase 
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the need to hedge; however it may also indirectly relate to revenue capacity as higher both in the past 
(having past need to borrow) and in the present (repayment of debt limiting other uses of revenue). So 
the expectation is that a higher debt to state GDP ratio is associated with increased bias.  
Hypothesis 9a: The debt to state GDP ratio is associated with revenue forecast bias. 
Bond rating measures debt, debt capacity and the general financial health of the state, which might 
include, for example, the tendency to have a surplus in previous years. A higher bond rating indicates 
more remaining debt capacity, thus it is associated with less need to hedge. However, it may also be 
associated with underestimation practices. To use bond rating in this analysis, an index is constructed 
ranging from 1 to 27 converting bond ratings for C- to AAA+ and averaged over Standard & Poor, 
Moody’s and Fitch. Some Moody’s ratings are adjusted. Missing values are dropped from the average. 
Hypothesis 9b: The state’s bond rating is associated with revenue forecast bias. 
 
Consistent with the explanation of Hypotheses 6a-6f, state laws – commonly known as Tax and 
Expenditure Limitations (TELS) – that restrict taxes or expenditures  may affect the perception of total 
available revenue in relationship to other factors such as prior tax rates. The National Conference of 
State Legislatures recognizes four types of TELS, three of which restrict taxes and one of which restricts 
expenditures in relationship to revenue. These include a requirement for a supermajority of the 
legislature to raise taxes; a similar requirement, but for a narrow set of taxes; a cap on some or all taxes; 
and a cap on the amount of expenditures linked to the amount of revenue available. Each of these types 
of limits may lead to an offset to the otherwise expected underestimation bias as the demand for 
services may lead to a requirement for more funds than the restricted funding sources provide. 
However, narrowing the supermajority requirement may mediate the effect somewhat. 
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Hypothesis 10a: A size of any supermajority requirement to raise taxes is associated with a 
positive coefficient. 
Hypothesis 10b: The fact that the supermajority is narrowed is associated with a bias. 
Hypothesis 10c:  The presence of a tax cap is associated with a positive coefficient. 
Hypothesis 10d: The presence of an expenditure cap conditioned on revenue is associated with 
a positive coefficient. 
Data 
The primary data for this study is extracted from National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) 
spring and fall Fiscal Survey of the States from 1991 through 2012, focusing on fiscal years 1993 through 
2011. These data are supplemented with a variety of data that have been discussed with respect to 
specific hypotheses and with a list of governors and party affiliation as found on the National Governor’s 
Association website, population data published by the United States Census Bureau, and state level 
gross domestic product (GDP) as published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis or the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis FRED data series.1  
The GDP data are in two partial series; however this is a more substantial concern for level than it is for 
year-to-year changes, which could be computed for all periods as the year in which the series changes, 
1997, both forms of the series are available. Modeling does not include an indicator for this change as it 
is collinear with time fixed effects.  Changes in changes are computed to account for acceleration or 
deceleration in economic activity and included as an independent variable. 
                                                          
1 Websites accessed include www.nasbo.org over several weeks in the spring of 2013; www.nga.org on Sept. 8, 
2013;  http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=1#reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1 on 
Sept. 8, 2013; and www.census.gov on Sept 8, 2013; and FRED http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ accessed in 
the spring of 2014. 
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The governor data were essentially ready to use, except that party changes for several governors were 
traced to determine to which party they belonged in the analysis years. 
The census data on state population is available in multiple tables, none of which are ready to use; 
however, they are generally made usable by deleting irrelevant details and combining data by decade. 
The NASBO semi-annual reports contain tables showing revenue in four categories, total revenue and 
corporate income tax (CIT), personal income tax (PIT), and sales tax. For periods beginning in 2006, the 
data are reported from the spring of the year before the fiscal year, through the fall of the year after the 
fiscal year. Beginning in 1993 through 2005, 4 periods, ending in the fall just after the fiscal year ends 
are reported.  For 1992, only two fall reports are available. For 1998, the first spring report is missing.  
For all these periods there is at least one report before the end of the fiscal year and at least one report 
after the end of the fiscal year. The last available report is treated as the actual. For those years where 
comparison is available, there is some evidence of modest updating by some states when more than one 
post-fiscal-year-end report is available; however most states report the same or nearly the same data in 
post-fiscal-year-end periods. The pre-fiscal year end reports are treated as forecasts, although some are 
a combination of partial forecast and partial actuals.  
The values are aggregate annual amounts; however, it is likely that most states forecast more granularly 
and sum to annual numbers. Horizons are calculated in months to the end of the fiscal year for which 
the totals are aggregated; however the exact number of months is unknown. For spring reports the 
assumed that the period begins in July and for fall reports, it is assumed that the period begins in 
January. This assumption allows calculation of months to the end of the fiscal year, which varies among 
the states and the slope of the horizon; however it may introduce a small error in the size of the 
intercept or, for no intercept models, for certain indicator variables. Because, as will later be seen, the 
actual size of slopes is very small, this error will also be very small. 
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For a small number of observations, either the forecast or the actual is imputed by substituting a value 
from another period. For a small number of observations, instances a gap of two periods leads to some 
weighted averaging. For 113 of these instances, the imputed value is the “actual,” and the forecast that 
is used as the imputed actual is dropped from the analysis. Regression models include controls to detect 
the effect of this imputation. 
Forecast Error Measure 
This paper follows Williams (2012) evaluating forecast bias with the model: 
� 𝐹−𝐴(𝐹+𝐴)/2
� � ∗ 100 = 𝛼 +∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 + 𝜀     (1) 
The dependent variable is the symmetric percent error.2 This model is updated to reflect the current set 
of hypotheses, which focus on a much broader range of explanatory variables as discussed in the 
hypotheses. Two sorts of models are estimated. One set focuses on multiple horizons and is estimated 
with OLS using fixed effects for states and years created through dummy variables. For this approach, 
there is one model for each of the three tax types. The other focuses on each of three horizons forming 
panels using states and years to form panels. For this approach, there is one model for each of three 
horizons, with respect to each of three tax types. Because of the complexity of data and the models, 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, cannot be evaluated with these models because the intercepts will be affected 
by the continuous variables which reach zero well outside realistic range of the data. Instead, they are 
examined with simple descriptive data as shown in Table 1  
[Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 shows that roughly 58% to 63% of the errors are negative for the aggregate of all tax types, the 
total of all tax types, and for corporate and personal income. For sales tax, the errors are negative 52% 
                                                          
2 For estimation purposes, the data are retained in ratio form, but results are represented in percentage form. 
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of the time. For the total, aggregate, and each tax type, the average of all errors is negative ranging from 
-0.6% (PIT) to -4.5% (CIT). While these descriptive results are not dispositive, they are consistent with 
hypotheses 1a and 1b, except with respect to sales tax, which is marginal. 
Regression Models 
Because of the large number of regression models and the large number of variables, results are 
grouped to display. All regression coefficients for a particular x variable are displayed in a 4 column (all 
horizons, and each of horizons 1 through 3) by 3 row (tax type CIT, PIT, and Sales) block. These blocks 
are shown in four tables, Strong Evidence, Variables with Interaction, Weak Evidence, and No Evidence. 
These tables report twelve separate regressions: three using {OLS with robust standard errors} and fixed 
effects through dummies for states and years for multiple horizons; and the remaining nine using XTReg 
with robust standard errors with fixed effects through panels for states formatted yearly.  For the OLS 
models, the F values are 4.9 for Sales Tax, 10.42 for CIT, and 15.87 for PIT, all have p-values < 0.001. For 
the panel data, the Wald Chi2 range from 1136.26 to 165662.66, all with p-values < 0.001. Explained 
variance ranges from 6.66% to 31.15%. All rho values are <.06. 
Variables marked no evidence have no significant coefficients in 12 regressions. The variables with 
interaction are displayed in a separate table to assist discussion. Variables marked strong evidence have 
a substantial number of significant coefficients with multiple tax types and horizons; and where there is 
a prior expectation of a direction, all or nearly all coefficients have the expected sign. The three 
coefficient of variation variables are considered together. The variables marked weak evidence have 
fewer substantial coefficients, with one exception where the results have inconsistent directional 
coefficients. 
[Table 2 Here] 
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Table 2 shows the variables with strong evidence of association.  The first block examines hypothesis 4 
that the state population, as a proxy for forecasting capacity, is positively associated with the forecast 
error. The variable LN Population is the log of the state population. Although not significant except once 
for individual horizons, it is highly significant for each of the tax types when examined in the multi-
horizon model and it has the expected sign with all significant coefficients and four of the remaining 
seven. The anticipated implication of is that when there is a larger population, there will be more 
capacity to forecast and the need to under-forecast to hedge against uncertainty will be reduced. 
The second block, examines hypothesis 5 that there is an associated between the acceleration or 
deceleration of the state GDP (at the time the forecast is made) and forecast error. It shows that the 
coefficients for all twelve models are negative, with significant coefficients for 9 of twelve models. The 
variable measures the change in the change of the state GDP, thus a positive value implies accelerating 
growth while a negative value implies deceleration, not necessarily actual decline. The negative 
coefficient implies that when there is a positive change at the time of the forecast, there will be 
underestimation and it implies the opposite for negative change at the time of the forecast. These 
results suggest the need for further investigation. 
The third block examines hypothesis 6a that the state and local revenue effort is positively associated 
with forecast error. This positive association is anticipated because, where there is insufficient revenue 
to meet demand for services, overestimation of revenue can provide flexibility for more spending. Ten 
of twelve coefficients have the anticipated sign and six are significant at each of the three horizons. The 
all horizon models have the anticipated sign, but are not statistically significant. Although these results 
could be stronger, the finding is particularly interesting in that it helps explain why poor jurisdictions 
exhibit different forecast biases than elsewhere.  
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The fourth block examines hypothesis 6f that unemployment is associated with forecast bias. There are 
9 negative coefficients, of which 6 are significant. These results are opposite the anticipated result from 
Brogan, who found positive coefficients with some significant t values. 
The fifth through seventh blocks examine hypothesis 8a, that the lagged 5 period coefficient of variance 
(CV5) for the three tax types is negatively associated with forecast error.3 This hypothesis is related to 
the view that high revenue variability increases the need to hedge against uncertainty; this concern 
arises not only where the forecast revenue has high variability, but also where other revenues have high 
variability. Block 5 (the first of these three blocks) examines CV5 for sales tax. All 12 coefficients are 
negative and 11 are statistically significant. Block 6 examines CV5 for PIT. Here 10 of 12 coefficients are 
negative, but only the 4 associated with the PIT forecasts are statistically significant. A potential 
explanation of these less significant findings is that fewer states have PIT revenue, so the models for 
Sales Tax, CIT and all horizons include a substantial number of zero values for this variable.  In block 7, 
the results for CV5 for CIT are as expected with respect to the CIT forecast, but are mixed with respect to 
the other forecasts, with two significant negative coefficient’s and four negative coefficients, two of 
which are significant. This inconsistency may relate to the relatively low contribution that CIT makes to 
most states’ revenue; of these three revenue types, the average contribution of CIT for all states 
excluding Alaska and New Hampshire (which rely heavily on CIT) is 8.5%. 
[Table 3 Here] 
Variables with Interaction 
Following Brogan, the divided legislature variable is interacted with two other variables, the Democratic 
Governor variable and the Democratic Factor variable.  The statistical significance for the direct effects 
for Democratic Governor and Democratic Factor are very slight. For Divided Legislature, there are 4 
                                                          
3 Where the tax type is not present, the coefficient of variance is assumed to be zero. 
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statistically significant positive coefficients, two with corporate income tax and two with personal 
income tax. For the Divided Legislature * Democratic Governor interaction, all coefficients are negative, 
but only three are statistically significant, one with corporate income tax and two with sales tax. For the 
Divided Legislature * Democratic Factor interaction, there are 5 statistically significant negative 
coefficients including all the corporate income tax models and one personal income tax model. There is 
one significant positive coefficient with sales tax. There is no discernable pattern with respect to 
horizons. In general these results are very mixed and would not be remarkable except for the Divided 
Legislature * Democratic Factor interaction.  
[Tables 4 Here] 
Weak and No Evidence 
In general the results with respect to the other coefficients are either weak or non-existent. Table4 
shows five hypotheses for which there are no statistically significant results. These include years to the 
next governor’s election (Hypothesis 3i), which Brogan reported as significant (as “term year”), and 
Biennial Budget Indicator (Hypothesis 8e), which Boyd, Dadayan, & Ward suggest is significant. Also 
excluded are: Third Party Governor (Hypothesis 3b), Governor Change to Democratic (Hypothesis 3f), 
and Tax or Expenditure Cap (Hypothesis 10c).  
[Table 5 Here] 
Table 5 shows 19 hypotheses for which there is weak evidence. With the exceptions discussed next, 
these have no more than three of 12 coefficients that are statistically significant. Even with these, some 
have inconsistent signs with the coefficients. Four hypotheses reported in Table 5 have 4 or 5 significant 
coefficients. Of these, two (Hypothesis 6c, Federal Fund Transfer / State Revenue; and hypothesis 10d, 
Expenditure Cap as a Ratio to Revenue) are excluded because the results are inconsistent, The 
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remaining two are: (1) Percent Vote for Governor (Hypothesis 3d), which has 11 of 12 positive 
coefficients with 4 statistically significant. Three of these are with models for corporate income tax. (2) 
Per Capital Real GDP (Hypothesis 6e), which has 9 of 12 positive coefficients, with 4 significant, 
distributed across all three tax types and differing horizons. 
Discussion 
The descriptive data shown with respect to hypothesis 1a and 1b are consistent with the view that 
underforecasting is common, although not ubiquitous. The regression analysis finds that most 
statistically significant independent variables are associated with uncertainty. Where there is greater 
capacity as suggested by population, uncertainty may be mitigated. The positive relation with revenue 
effort suggests that there is a counterbalancing bias favoring finding enough money to pay for the 








  Highest Lowest Average Total <0 Total Share <0 
CIT 6.5% -15.7% -4.5% 533 861 62% 
PIT 3.8% -7.1% -0.6% 476 797 60% 
Sales Tax  4.5% -77.3% -2.2% 449 860 52% 
Total 6.5% -77.3% -2.5% 1458 2518 58% 








        All Horizons H1 H2 H3 
H P Tax Symmetrical Ratio Error Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
4 + CIT LN Population 0.058 *** 0.003   0.005 ** 0.003   
4 + PIT LN Population 0.017 *** -0.0002   0.001   0.0003   
4 + Sales LN Population 0.023 *** 0.0003   -0.0001   -0.0002   
5   CIT 2Dif %GDP -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.002 *** 
5 
 
PIT 2Dif %GDP -0.0001   -0.0001   -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
5   Sales 2Dif %GDP -0.0004 *** -0.0002   -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
6a + CIT S & L Rev Effort 0.065   0.142 ** 0.167 ** 0.190 *** 
6a + PIT S & L Rev Effort 0.034   0.076 *** 0.127 *** 0.115 *** 
6a + Sales S & L Rev Effort 0.022   -0.066   -0.017   0.020   
6f + CIT Unemployment Rate -0.028 *** -0.012 ** -0.014 *** -0.010   
6f + PIT Unemployment Rate -0.003   -0.006 *** -0.001   0.003   
6f + Sales Unemployment Rate -0.007   -0.004 * 0.001   0.001   
8a1 - CIT Coef Var. 5 Period, Sales Tax -0.010 * -0.008 ** -0.013 ** -0.009   
8a1 - PIT Coef Var. 5 Period, Sales Tax -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.004 ** -0.009 ** 
8a1 - Sales Coef Var. 5 Period, Sales Tax -0.059 *** -0.071 *** -0.047 *** -0.078 *** 
8a2 - CIT Coef Var. 5 Period, PIT 0.011   -0.003   -0.007   -0.032   
8a2 - PIT Coef Var. 5 Period, PIT -0.025 *** -0.019 ** -0.056 *** -0.053 *** 
8a2 - Sales Coef Var. 5 Period, PIT -0.010   0.003   -0.009   -0.012   
8a3 - CIT Coef Var. 5 Period, CIT -0.021 *** -0.017 *** -0.053 *** -0.053 *** 
8a3 - PIT Coef Var. 5 Period, CIT 0.003   0.002   -0.006 ** -0.008 *** 






Variables with Interaction 
H P Tax   All Horizons H1 H2 H3 
3a   CIT Democratic Governor 0.005   0.025   0.025   0.028   
3a 
 
PIT Democratic Governor 0.006   -0.004   0.019 ** 0.011   
3a   Sales Democratic Governor -0.003   0.008   -0.005   -0.009   
3k   CIT Dem Governor * Divided Leg -0.004   -0.077 ** -0.025   -0.080   
3k 
 
PIT Dem Governor * Divided Leg -0.012   -0.005   -0.009   -0.027   
3k   Sales Dem Governor * Divided Leg -0.017   -0.045 * -0.022   -0.041 ** 
3c   CIT Divided Legislature 0.032 * 0.052 ** 0.044   0.063   
3c 
 
PIT Divided Legislature 0.020 ** 0.013   0.006   0.026 ** 
3c   Sales Divided Legislature 0.000   -0.006   -0.008   0.009   
3m   CIT Div. Leg * Democratic Factor -0.048 ** -0.052 * -0.098 ** -0.102 * 
3m 
 
PIT Div. Leg * Democratic Factor 0.006   -0.023 * 0.019   -0.007   
3m   Sales Div. Leg * Democratic Factor -0.003   0.014   0.017   0.036 ** 
3l   CIT Democratic Factor -0.006   -0.011   0.001   -0.013   
3l 
 
PIT Democratic Factor -0.005   -0.003   -0.009 * -0.012 * 








        All Horizons H1 H2 H3 
H P Tax Symmetrical Ratio Error Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
3b   CIT Third Party Governor 0.062   0.048   0.074   0.018   
3b 
 
PIT Third Party Governor 0.029   -0.023   0.060   0.025   
3b   Sales Third Party Governor -0.001   0.034   0.025   0.017   
3f   CIT Gov. Change to Democratic 0.041   -0.004   -0.017   0.023   
3f 
 
PIT Gov. Change to Democratic 0.009   0.010   -0.015   0.003   
3f   Sales Gov. Change to Democratic 0.016   -0.013   0.023   0.026   
3i   CIT Years to Next G. Election -0.005   -0.004   0.003   -0.001   
3i 
 
PIT Years to Next G. Election -0.002   -0.003   -0.003   -0.001   
3i   Sales Years to Next G. Election 0.004   0.004   0.008   0.009   
8e - CIT Biennial Budget Indicator -0.057   -0.012   -0.022   -0.019   
8e - PIT Biennial Budget Indicator -0.003   0.010   -0.004   0.001   
8e - Sales Biennial Budget Indicator 0.008   -0.024   -0.012   -0.021   
10c + CIT TEL: Tax or Expenditure Cap 0.015   -0.007   0.019   0.014   
10c + PIT TEL: Tax or Expenditure Cap 0.021   0.001   -0.003   0.004   







        All Horizons H1 H2 H3 
H P Tax Symmetrical Ratio Error Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
2 - CIT Monthly Horizon -0.002 ** -0.011 * -0.010   0.006   
2 - PIT Monthly Horizon 0.00003   0.008   0.001   0.001   
2 - Sales Monthly Horizon 0.0001   -0.007   -0.001   -0.009   
3d   CIT Percent Vote for Governor 0.001 * 0.002   0.004 *** 0.004 ** 
3d 
 
PIT Percent Vote for Governor 0.0003   -0.0001   0.001   0.001 * 
3d   Sales Percent Vote for Governor 0.0004   0.001   0.0002   0.001   
3e   CIT Change in Governor -0.004   0.008   0.029   0.009   
3e 
 
PIT Change in Governor -0.015 ** -0.011   0.005   -0.004   
3e   Sales Change in Governor -0.004   -0.001   0.008   -0.014   
3g   CIT Gov. Change to Republican 0.100 *** 0.070   0.009   0.064   
3g 
 
PIT Gov. Change to Republican 0.014   -0.006   0.003   0.000   
3g   Sales Gov. Change to Republican -0.012   -0.010   -0.016   0.002   
3h   CIT Gov. Change to Third Party -0.236 ** -0.135   -0.269   -0.205   
3h 
 
PIT Gov. Change to Third Party -0.017   0.024   -0.038   0.007   
3h   Sales Gov. Change to Third Party -0.009   -0.018   -0.032   -0.035   
3j   CIT Most Freq. Leg Election Year 0.035 ** 0.031   0.021   0.038 * 
3j 
 
PIT Most Freq. Leg Election Year -0.002   0.005   0.008   0.001   
3j   Sales Most Freq. Leg Election Year 0.002   0.015 * 0.007   0.009   
6b   CIT State Share S&L Rev Effort 0.033   0.013   0.028   0.023   
6b 
 
PIT State Share S&L Rev Effort -0.007   -0.018 *** 0.003   0.003   
6b   Sales State Share S&L Rev Effort 0.027 * 0.003   0.002   -0.002   
6c   CIT Fed Trans/ State Revenue 0.022 * 0.005   0.011   0.009   
6c 
 
PIT Fed Trans/ State Revenue 0.002   -0.005   0.002   0.001   
6c   Sales Fed Trans/ State Revenue 0.016 *** -0.010 ** -0.002   -0.009 * 
6d   CIT Est Real Per C Pers. Income -0.039   -0.011   0.001   -0.005   
6d 
 
PIT Est Real Per C Pers. Income -0.013   0.011 ** 0.014 ** 0.007   
6d   Sales Est Real Per C Pers. Income -0.015   0.002   0.007   0.006   
6e   CIT Per Capita Real GPD 0.075 * 0.001   -0.003   -0.002   
6e 
 
PIT Per Capita Real GPD 0.019   -0.004   0.011   0.018 ** 
6e   Sales Per Capita Real GPD 0.010   0.006   0.019 * 0.022 ** 
7   CIT Revenue Diversity -0.073 ** -0.030   -0.017   -0.015   
7 
 
PIT Revenue Diversity -0.013   0.008   -0.027 *** -0.027 *** 
7   Sales Revenue Diversity 0.026   -0.008   0.005   0.003   
8b - CIT Share GDP from Mining -0.061   -0.055   -0.061   -0.078   
8b - PIT Share GDP from Mining 0.030   0.032 ** -0.011   0.011   
8b - Sales Share GDP from Mining -0.011   0.020   -0.012   -0.005   
8c - CIT Share  GDP from Farming 0.071   -0.009   0.024   -0.021   
8c - PIT Share  GDP from Farming -0.098 * -0.021   -0.035   -0.037   
8c - Sales Share  GDP from Farming -0.029   -0.016   -0.021   -0.028   
8d - CIT BSF/State Rev -0.005   -0.017 * -0.023   -0.029   
8d - PIT BSF/State Rev -0.029 ** -0.039 *** -0.018   -0.031   
8d - Sales BSF/State Rev 0.004   -0.007   0.024   0.028   
9a   CIT Debt over GDP 0.168 *** 0.066   0.083 ** 0.055   
9a 
 
PIT Debt over GDP -0.012   0.026   0.007   0.011   




        All Horizons H1 H2 H3 
H P Tax Symmetrical Ratio Error Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
9b   CIT Bond Rating Index -0.004   -0.002   0.007   0.005   
9b 
 
PIT Bond Rating Index -0.002   0.004   0.002   0.008 * 
9b   Sales Bond Rating Index -0.012 * -0.010 ** -0.002   -0.004   
10a + CIT TEL: Supermaj. Size Required 0.052   0.010   0.056   0.048   
10a + PIT TEL: Supermaj. Size Required -0.015   0.003   0.047 *** 0.028 * 
10a + Sales TEL: Supermaj. Size Required -0.014   -0.011   0.019   0.005   
10b   CIT TEL: Narrow Supermajority 0.070   0.003   -0.075 * -0.066   
10b 
 
PIT TEL: Narrow Supermajority 0.088 ** 0.032   -0.026   -0.012   
10b   Sales TEL: Narrow Supermajority 0.655 *** 0.088   0.064   0.060   
10d + CIT TEL: Exp. Cap R to Revenue -0.003   0.001   -0.005   -0.004   
10d + PIT TEL: Exp. Cap R to Revenue 0.042 *** 0.004 * -0.003 * -0.003   
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